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Abstract
Since his election into office, a cloud of uncertainty has surrounded President
Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. Much of today’s scholarship concerns its
unpredictable nature and scope. President Trump, like previous presidents have come
before him, entered office with very little foreign policy experience. A key feature of his
non-principled, fast-alternating foreign policy is that few people know exactly what he is
going to propose next in terms of his international strategy. Coupled with this strategy is
Trump’s desire for international credibility and a strong reputation. This desire seems
fundamentally at odds with his foreign policy strategy, as Trump proposes isolationist
measures and countries learn to fear his foreign policy’s unpredictability.
This paper aims to take a critical look at the role of humanitarian intervention in a
country’s foreign policy. It analyses whether countries like the United States can
successfully introduce humanitarian intervention as a successful foreign policy
prescription. More specifically, it aims to answer the following research question: is it
possible for the United States to reclaim its founding values through intervention in
humanitarian crises without hindering the country’s military credibility?
This paper first proposes theory, then aims to cement that theory in a real-world
scenario through the analysis of a specific case study. It uses a combination of primary
sources, secondary sources, and more qualitative methods of data gathering to deeply
analyze the relationship between humanitarian intervention, military credibility, and the
United States’ founding values. It then goes on to critically analyze the application of
these findings to the genocide currently occurring in West Sudan.
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“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, then that good men should look on
and do nothing” - John Stuart Mill, 1867
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether it not there is room for
humanitarian intervention in the President Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. More
specifically, it’s aim is to assess whether it’s possible for the United States to sustain its
founding values through intervention in humanitarian crisis without hindering the
country’s military credibility.
America was founded on a strong set of moral principles and values, many of
which become easily apparent after even a cursory glance at the country’s Declaration of
Independence and Constitution. The Founders aimed to depart in almost every way from
British rule. Modern scholarship on the topic of the American founding generally agrees
that this means that the country’s founding was largely based on liberalist ideology.1 For
example, they bore the consequences of struggles of power between the English monarch
and Parliament, and created a system of separated powers and representative government
in response to these experiences. This meant creating a government with strong
democratic values, values that included the right to life, justice, liberty, and social
equality.
With these values in mind, the United States’ systemic non-intervention to
prevent or stop acts of international genocide seems largely inconsistent with the
country’s greater concepts of democracy and civilization. A look into the history of U.S.’
foreign policy with respect to general humanitarian intervention shows that time and time
1
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again, state sovereignty and U.S. ambition rise above larger values of democracy and
equality of being. What makes U.S. non-intervention especially disturbing is the fact that
genocides, unlike wars, are perpetrated against a group because of who they are, not what
they have done.2 Genocide is not a response by one party to an act of violence by
another. Instead, victims of genocide are targeted because of characteristics they are born
with and oftentimes cannot change, such as ethnicity or religious view. Given these facts,
isn’t it of even greater importance for the United States to be at the forefront of the
international response to such atrocities? Instead of extending the country’s founding
values to the international community, the U.S. routinely promotes treaties of profit and
pleasure over those of higher moral significance.
Since his election into office, President Trump has consistently pushed for
military might over more humanitarian approaches in his foreign policy. In addition, he
has proven to be inconsistent in his decision making, and eager to move on from current
issues.3 It’s well known that humanitarian intervention costs money and resources. It
requires a sympathetic response to the suffering of others, even if that intervention, on its
face, does not seem to further domestic goals. The nature of humanitarian intervention,
therefore, seems completely at odds with Trump’s proclaimed foreign policy, one that
aims to narrowly further U.S. national interests, even at the expense of human rights,
third world development, and humanitarian relief.4 This paper hopes to dispel the myth
that humanitarian intervention must be pursued at the expense of national interests and

2
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aims to discover that, in fact, intervention in humanitarian crisis can actually help bolster
a country’s domestic economic, social, and political goals.
This paper will begin by looking at the United States’ history with intervention in
humanitarian crisis, focusing specifically on genocide. This analysis will be used as a
backdrop for a theoretical exploration into whether humanitarian intervention can help
the United States better connect with its founding values. In tandem, this paper will look
at whether intervention in genocide can be achieved without hurting the United States’
international military credibility and if this type of intervention, under certain
circumstances, can actually aid the United States in bolstering its international reputation.
The final section of this paper will be dedicated to applying the theory explored in the
first half to a relevant case study. The current genocide in Western Sudan will be
analyzed, and the framework of intervention established in earlier sections will be
applied. A case study will be used in the hopes of cementing the theoretical discoveries
made earlier to the real world. These conclusions will hopefully act as a catalyst for
future foreign policy considerations on this topic of humanitarian intervention – policies
that will better suit important legal, ethical, and moral concerns.
Research Methodology
In crafting, acquiring, and compiling all the necessary parts of this paper, a
combination of primary and secondary sources was used in an attempt to acquire the most
comprehensive view of the complex relationship between American founding values,
humanitarian intervention in genocide, and the U.S.’ military credibility For one, original
interviews by former and current politicians were used in order to understand the
geopolitical constraints on political decision-making. To expand the breadth of primary
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sources that were used, original studies from the Department of Defense and other
governmental organizations were utilized to gain a better sense of contemporary
challenges and possibilities regarding the United States’ international reputation and
credibility.
In addition to primary sources, a wide variety of secondary sources were utilized.
These included opinion pieces released by NGOs, scholars, and experts, and various
studies on the ability of the United States to use humanitarian intervention to bolster the
country’s reputation. In addition, persuasive essays on these topics were analyzed.
Secondary data was collected using JSTOR and other wide-ranging databases. In
addition, various reports and journal articles were pulled directly from organizations’
websites.
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Chapter I: The United States’ History with Humanitarian Intervention
This section will critically evaluate the United States’ relationship with
humanitarian intervention in genocide in an attempt to identify key geopolitical
considerations that are taken into account throughout the decision-making process. This
analysis will be bound to a short case study in order to deepen the level of study.
The Rise of “Genocide” in American Politics
Even a cursory glance at the United States’ history with humanitarian intervention
paints a bleak picture. Many scholars and advocates for such intervention argue in earnest
that the United States has been consistently slow to act in the face of genocidal situations.
In her enlightening novel “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide,
Samantha Power reveals that the United States has never in its history intervened to stop
genocide and has in fact rarely made a point of condemning it as it occurred.5
Efforts to bring acts of genocide into politicians’ purview did not substantially
occur until the 1920’s. After hearing about the assassination of Talaat Pasha, one of the
main perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, a Polish Jew by the name of Raphael
Lemkin became interested in why Talaat, among others, had not been held responsible
for his blatant violations of law and crimes against humanity.6 Specifically, Lemkin
became intrigued why Talaat had not been arrested for his crimes in the first place and
why there were no international laws covering such atrocities. Lemkin began lobbying
members of Congress in the late 1930’s, following Hitler’s invasion of Poland. His
attempts to spur action against crimes of atrocity largely fell flat. In response, Lemkin
brought his message to the general public in the hopes that citizens would pressure their
5
6
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political representatives into action. Again, his cries fell on deaf ears. Both government
officials in the Allied countries and journalists played down the intelligence of those
reporting from Germany, arguing that the information was unsubstantiated and
untrustworthy.7 This response was largely motivated by the simple fact that government
officials and the larger public were unable to conceptualize the levels of heinousness
being reported. This reaction is woven deeply into the fabric of the United States’
relationship with international crimes of atrocity.
Around this time, Lemkin also began searching for a word that could be used to
describe and stand for the atrocities in Nazi Germany and Turkey. He settled on
genocide: geno was the Greek derivative for “race” or “tribe” and cide, the Latin
derivative for “killing”.8 Lemkin hoped that by specifying certain crimes under this term,
it would be easier for politicians and the larger citizenry to conceptualize and support the
fight against those acts. Lemkin’s next advancement in his fight for the recognition of
genocide was to draft a United Nations (UN) treaty banning genocide. He wanted the UN
to establish a law that, if passed, would signal a new international reality in which states
would no longer be able to use sovereignty to avoid taking responsibility for their
actions.9 On December 11th, 1948, the General Assembly passed a law banning
genocide.
What ensued, including the United States’ refusal to ratify the convention, sheds a
bright light on the country’s seeming inability to place higher moral principles over
domestic interests. Although the convention had received U.S. support at the UN, many

7
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policymakers feared that the ambiguous language of the treaty could be used to target the
United States in future military action. As Power writes, “The core of American
objections to the treaty had little to do with the text… rather American opposition was
rooted in a traditional hostility towards any infringement on U.S. sovereignty, which was
only amplified by the red scare of the 1950’s”.10
The history of the Genocide Convention in itself highlights the complexity of the
negotiation and adoption of such treaties. Perhaps even more importantly, it shows just
how painstakingly the United States protects its sovereignty and personal interests above
all. After the Convention was adopted by the UN, it took the United States nearly 40
years to ratify it. Some politicians were concerned, especially during the Korean War and
the Vietnam War, that U.S. officials might come under frivolous accusations of genocide.
Similarly, some felt as though the ratification might result in charges of genocide due to
the country’s history of segregation, lynching, and Ku Klux Klan activities.11 Others
worried that if the United States ratified the convention, the country would be obligated
to send military forces to distant countries in order to enforce it.
Since the U.S. has ratified the Genocide Convention, the country has made very
modest progress in its responses to genocide. Though the geopolitical constraints
influencing U.S. decision-making have shifted with time, the U.S. has consistently
refused to take risks in order to suppress acts of genocide.12 The very people who can
push the policy agenda on intervention have been consistently muted and self-censored.13
Though the geopolitical factors at play are complex and the decision-making process
10
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intricate, the United States’ desire to remain uninvolved can be boiled down into a simple
thought process: attempting to spur the United States into action requires personal risk.
Up until now, politicians have argued that there is little geopolitically to be gained by
getting involved in international genocide. They also argue that only risks and costs are
inevitable. The idea remains that there are no risks when the U.S. decides to stay largely
uninvolved.14
This phenomenon can be clearly seen during the Rwandan genocide. Intelligence
reports obtained using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act show the cabinet, and almost
certainly President Clinton, had been told of a planned “final solution to eliminate all
Tutsis” before the slaughter reached its peak.15 They reveal that the U.S. government
knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives, yet passed up countless
opportunities to do exactly that. These documents undermine claims by Clinton and his
senior officials that they did not fully appreciate the scale and speed of the killings. In
addition, the administration avoided using the word “genocide”, as they feared the word
would generate public opinion which would demand American action.16 In reality the
administration simply felt that the U.S. had no interests in Rwanda, a small central
African country with no minerals or obvious strategic value.
U.S. Nonintervention in Cambodia: A Short Case Study
In order to more deeply understand the United States’ complicated relationship
with humanitarian intervention, it is important to assess the geopolitical factors
influencing the country’s actions. The United States’ actions during the Cambodian

14
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genocide highlight deep-rooted tensions surrounding the United States’ understanding of
how humanitarian intervention fits into the nation’s larger foreign policy scheme. From
April 1975 to January 1979, the Communist Khmer Rouge (KR) killed nearly two million
Cambodian people under their rule. Their goal was to transform Cambodia into a
classless agrarian utopia.17 In reality, the group committed mass murder and other
widespread atrocities; The KR systematically emptied entire cities and evacuated millions
of people to labor camps. Within these camps, disease, exhaustion, and starvation were
extremely prevalent. The vast majority of laborers were abused and eventually starved to
death. It’s generally estimated that between 1.7 and 2 million Cambodians died during
the 4-year reign of the KR.18
There was little to no protest from the international community, including the
United States. Neither the U.S. nor Europe called attention to the acts of atrocity as they
escalated. The U.S. government was largely silent on the topic, and Congress failed to
pass any piece of substantial legislation that could have paved the way for military action
or humanitarian aid.
Power points to a handful of factors that help explain the United States’ noninvolvement in international genocidal acts, including the Cambodian genocide. Among
the important factors, she cites America’s inability to conceptualize widespread terror in
the face of possible genocide.19 In the Cambodian genocide, policymakers and much of
the public assumed that violence on the levels described by refugees and survivors could
not occur. Policymakers, in particular, trusted the reassurances of the very government

17
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committing acts of atrocity. Diplomats, journalists, and Cambodians, and Americans
largely dismissed omens of imminent mass violence by the KR.20 Despite signs pointing
otherwise, many believed that once the KR won the war against the Lon Nol government,
they would have no need to initiate further acts of terror and killing.21 As Power points
out, “In advance of the KR seizure of Phnom Penh, prolific early warnings of the
organization’s brutality were matched by boundless wishful thinking on the part of
American observers and Cambodian citizens. ”22 Without strong leadership, the system
was inclined towards risk-averse policy choices.
In addition, American political leaders interpret society-wide silence on the issue
as an indicator of general indifference towards these events. They use this “indifference”
to justify abstention from troop deployment in areas of conflict.23 Even when the facts
emerged regarding the KR’s brutality in Cambodia, U.S. politicians responded with
general disinterest and non-engagement.

There was not a single interest group or

organization who was able to convince U.S. decision-makers that the millions of
Cambodian deaths mattered enough to American interests to warrant attention. Strikingly,
the U.S. policy of silence in the face of widespread humanitarian suffering was not
seriously contested. Domestic political forces that might have pressed for action were
absent, and most U.S. officials opposed to American involvement were firmly convinced
that they were doing all they could - in light of competing American interests and a
highly restrained understanding of what was “possible” for the United States to do.

20
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As with many other genocides, the Cambodian genocide highlights broader points
about humanitarian intervention and U.S. foreign policy. Namely, that politicians and
powerful change-makers do not see intervention in genocide to be compatible enough
with American interests to warrant action. Because America’s “vital national interests”
were not considered imperiled by mere genocide, senior U.S. officials did not give the
events in Cambodia the moral attention it warranted. It would have been politically
unthinkable to intervene militarily and emotionally unpleasant to pay too close attention
to the atrocities occurring there. The U.S. government realized instead, that it was
domestically cost-free to look away. This is what so many people did, before, during, and
after the Khmer Rouge’s reign of terror. In the United States, as with many other
countries, foreign policy is viewed as a lifeless set of abstractions. Terms like “interests”,
“influence”, and “prestige” are dehumanized terms which encourage easy inattention to
the real people whose lives are affected by the country’s foreign policy decisions.24 In
other words, policy analysis on whether the U.S. should intervene in Cambodia largely
excluded discussion of human consequences. A foundational piece of this process is the
mindset that policy is made by the “tough-minded”. To talk of suffering is to lose
“effectiveness” and it is seen as a sign that one’s rational arguments are weak.
As this paper will show, politicians must avoid seeing humanitarian intervention
in genocide as a zero-sum gain. Largely, the current mindset stands as this: genocide is
wrong, but the United States does not have a strong enough interest in preventing it to
invest the military, financial, or political capital needed to stop it. History has shown that
American policymakers have two main objectives. The first is to avoid engagement in
24
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conflicts that pose little threat to American interests, or carry no obvious geopolitical
gains. The second is to contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma associated
with allowing genocide.25 This paper will show that humanitarian intervention in
genocide, under certain conditions, and with certain stipulations, serves as a feasible way
for the United States to both reclaim its founding values and increase its international
reputation. Politicians and scholars should start seeing humanitarian intervention as a
politically strategic avenue for the United States to pursue.

25
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Chapter II: Humanitarian Intervention and America’s Values Since the Founding
As was mentioned earlier, the United States’ refusal to intervene substantially in
genocide remains completely at odds with the country’s founding values. For a country as
influential and resource-rich as the United States to act in blatant disregard for its
foundational principles remains shocking to many. Politicians and political leaders
routinely tout democracy and other similar values in campaign speeches and Senate
hearings. Yet, when it comes to international breaches of these values, they sit back and
remain largely silent. This chapter provides an overview of America’s key founding
values and critically analyzes humanitarian intervention as a way for the United States to
reclaim these values in a significant and meaningful way. As James Wilson, one of the
six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United
States declared, “There is not in the whole science of politicks a more solid or a more
important maxim than this - that of all governments, those are the best, which, by the
natural effect of their constitutions, are frequently renewed or drawn back to their first
principles”.26 In order to see how to best move forward, we must critically analyze the
founding principles of the society which we speak of.
The United States’ Founding Values
In order to boil down the founding into its main principles, it is necessary to
identify and assess which factors most heavily influenced the sentiments and desires of
the Founding Fathers; It requires an appreciation for historical precedents and
constitutional principles. Among other factors, the Founders were heavily influenced by
26
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the Enlightenment and its belief that individuals have the capacity to develop and
participate in self-government.27 It was during this period of time when many thinkers
turned to reason and science to explain both the physical universe and human behavior.
In America, it was decided that instead of being “subjects” ruled by a monarch, people
should be citizens of a republic that upheld the ideals of democracy and representative
government. The Founders believed that in return for general protection and order, the
People would give up a small portion of their independence to their political
representatives.28 In tandem with this thinking was the idea that the purpose of the U.S.
Constitution was to protect the dignity and worth of individuals, enabling them to
promote their skills and talents. The Constitution’s principal framer, James Madison,
believed that an individual “has property in his opinions and in the free communication of
them”.29 This property stake extended not just to material items, but to religious opinions
and, most importantly, personal safety. Generally, the belief was as follows: it was the
main responsibility of the government to promote the protection of its citizens’ property
in all its forms. In return, those citizens would give their power and trust to the
Constitution, in effect upholding the republic and the flag.30 The Founders strongly
valued liberty as both an end and as a means.
In addition to the protection of individual liberty, the Founders also saw the
pursuit of life and general happiness as a foundational principle of the new republic. The
opening lines of the Declaration of Independence point to this fact. The Founders
27
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believed that an individual’s right to life should be considered sacred except in highly
restricted and extreme circumstances, such as the use of deadly force to protect one’s
own home or the lives of others. They drew on the current thinking of the time and used
ideas of natural rights, such as the right to life, to justify their separation from England.31
Many modern scholars believe that Thomas Jefferson, in his drafting of the Declaration
of Independence, drew heavily from the writings of English Philosopher John Locke.
Locke, who authored his Second Treatise of Government in 1689, wrote that all
individuals are equal in the sense that they are born with certain “inalienable” natural
rights, among which he believed to be life, liberty, and property. Locke believed that the
most basic human law of nature is the preservation of mankind.32 To serve that purpose,
he reasoned, individuals have both a right and a duty to preserve their own lives. These
foundational principles motivated the Founders’ proof that revolution was necessary in
order to end England’s tyranny over the colonists.33 Additionally, it is important to note
that, as with other rights, the Founders saw the right to life as “self-evident”.34 In other
words, the right to life is a self-evident truth that is not based on the speculations and
shifting opinions of men.
In addition to the foundational principles of the pursuit of life, liberty, and
happiness, the Founders considered justice and social equality to be values of equal
importance. In other words, the Founders believed that people should be treated fairly in
the distribution of benefits and burdens of society, the correction of wrongs and injuries,
31
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and the gathering of information and making of decisions. The creation of a
representative government was necessary in order to achieve these goals. As John Adams
argued, “Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders
itself.”35 What resulted was a system of government where, among other things, the
various branches of government balanced and checked each other’s constitutionally
enumerated powers. The American republic solved the republican problem of corruption
and degeneration over time by providing a power of constitutional amendment and
allowing constant adaptation through a periodic return to founding principles. The U.S.
Constitution is written in such a way as to vest in each branch core powers, powers which
are to be exercised exclusively by that branch. At the same time, the Constitution also
puts a check on the tendencies of any one branch toward self-aggrandizement by giving
each branch a “partial agency” in the affairs of the others.36 Protecting from the “tyranny
of the majority” meant framing the government in a way that allowed it to control the
governed, and in the next step oblige it to control itself. The Founders worked to allow
divergent, uncomfortable, or unpopular voices to be heard in politics, instead of allowing
the opinion of the majority, however informed, to always rule.
In addition, they believed that the values discussed above must be protected by
natural law. Generally, the Founders believed that all men and women had certain
unalienable rights, but that they must be understood within the limits of moral and civil
law.37 It was accepted that a stern, self-renouncing virtue was essential in a democratic

35
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republic.38 Democratic citizens would need to learn to love the laws, love their country,
and largely prefer public goods above their own private ones. Since loving the democracy
meant loving equality, citizens would have to abstain from actions that would destroy
equality and limit their desires for securing necessities.39 As Alexis de Tocqueville wrote
in the introductory chapter of Democracy in America, “... nothing struck me more
forcibly than the general equality of conditions… it creates opinions, engenders
sentiments, suggests the ordinary in life, and modifies whatever it does not produce”.40
Through their promotion of a representative government and liberty, the Founders
managed to promote a more general notion of diversity. Diversity, for the Founders, was
inclusive. They saw it broadly as variety in culture and ethnic background, race, and
lifestyle. The belief was that diversity was not only permissible but desirable and
beneficial in a pluralist society.41 James Madison argued that the freedoms the
Constitution guaranteed depended on this pluralism: “This freedom arises from that
multiplicity of sects which pervades America,” he said at the Virginia ratifying
convention, “for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of any
one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.”42 He repeated this point in Federalist Paper
No. 10, where he argued that factions would not easily be able to attain their ends under
the Constitution as long as there remained a diversity of interests in the large republic.

38
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In tandem with these ideals came a toleration of difference. It developed in
parallel with the early liberalism prevalent among American thinkers’ European
Enlightenment forbearers.43 It reflected a larger belief that hatred or fear of other races
and creeds interfered with economic trade, extinguished freedom of thought and
expression, eroded the basis for friendship among nations, and led to persecution and
war. As mentioned earlier, America’s Founders were largely inspired by philosophical
thinkers like John Locke. In his work A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues that
government is generally ill-equipped to judge the rightness or wrongness of opposing
opinions on topics spanning religious doctrines and societal views.44 Generally, the
Founders strongly agreed that only through the promotion of diversity of thought,
experience, and desire would America grow to become a powerful nation.
Contemporary Shifts
The preceding paragraphs have outlined a series of foundational values that the
Framers embraced while creating the United States’ government and society. Among
them are the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. In addition, the Framers supported the
ideals of justice, social equality, and diversity. These values are incredibly important, as
they help us understand the qualities and values that helped forge our powerful country.
In addition to identifying and appreciating them, it is important to take time to look at
how these values have translated into contemporary times. Has the United States been
able to uphold these values in the 21st century? As Joe Biden argues, “America’s ability

43
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to lead the world depends not just on the example of our power, but on the power of our
example.”45
Scholars largely agree that America’s values are in upheaval. This is triggered in
large part by advances in technology, prolonged pessimism, and a loss of confidence in
major social, political, economic, and religious institutions.46 In a study conducted in
2012 by Penn Schoen Berland between May 25 and June 6, more than two-thirds of those
surveyed believed that American values had declined. They pointed to political
corruption, increased materialism, and declining family values as large catalysts in this
assessment.47 Of those surveyed, half expect American values to continue to weaken over
the next decade.
These sentiments are alarming, as many would argue that our country, including
its politicians, should be constantly working to reclaim our founding values and flush
them throughout every political decision made. American values are not so abstract that
they should shift and shape according to whoever claims them. Contrary to popular
belief, American values are not regional - they should be held with reverence and seen as
unifying forces that propel the country forward.48
While the country is far from perfect, it should never give up the struggle to grow
closer to the ideals embedded in its founding documents. History has shown that other
nations tend to follow the United States’ lead because they know that America does not
simply protect its own interests, but makes attempts to advance the aspirations of all.
45

Biden, 2017.
Penn, 2012.
47
Ibid.
48
Biden, 2017.
46

Arntson 20

Placing American democratic values back at the center of our foreign policy does not
mean that the country should simply impose its principles abroad or refuse to talk with
nations whose policies run counter to them. American values are the ones that tie to our
closest allies. The ability of America to reconnect and reclaim its values through foreign
policy will help assure U.S. allies that the United States will continue to support them and
to stand up for democracy.
Leading with the values outlined above means that we speak out when nations
violate their citizens’ rights. It is widely believed that the country can meet its security
imperatives without giving a green light to dictators who abuse universal human rights. A
foreign policy built on American values must stand firm against foreign powers that
celebrate a perceived withdrawal of American leadership as an opportunity to increase
their influence.
The Interplay of American Values and Genocide
As the above discussion has shown, America was founded on a strong set of
values that were deeply woven into the country’s founding documents by the Framers.
Equally as important, there is strong evidence that the country has markedly shifted away
from its founding values since the Framers first wrote the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution of the United States. In tandem with this shift comes the general
sense that America’s founding values are not considered in foreign policy decisions and
that the values so revered by individuals domestically are not supported and sustained
abroad. The intentions and actions of those involved in genocidal acts go against
America’s founding values in every imaginable way.
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In 1996, Gregory Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch, presented a briefing
paper called The 8 Stages of Genocide at the United States Department of State.49 In it, he
suggested that genocide develops in eight stages that are “predictable but not
inexorable”.50 He also argued that though later stages must be preceded by earlier stages,
all stages continue to operate throughout the process. The Stanton paper was presented at
the State Department shortly after the Rwandan genocide and much of the analysis
presented is based on why that genocide occurred. Stanton identified the following eight
stages of genocide: “classification”, “symbolization”, dehumanization”, “organization”,
polarization”, “preparation”, “extermination” and finally “denial”.51 These stages paint a
very clear picture of what typically happens from start to finish during any particular
genocide and at every stage, there are clear breaches of American founding values.
During acts of genocide, people are divided into “us and them”. This already
shows a breach of American values, as people are generally categorized by either their
race, religious creed, or other defining characteristics in order to inflict harm on one
specific group of people. What distinguishes genocide from war, and what makes it
arguably more vile, is that victims of genocide are largely targeted for who they are, not
specific actions they’ve taken. The “classification” of a certain subset of people in a
society shows the beginning of this process. It allows the third stage, “dehumanization”,
to occur, as one group denies the humanity of another group.52 This denial of humanity,
or the state of being human, is in direct violation of all of the founding values identified
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earlier. Genocide involves systematically categorizing, separating, and exterminating a
group of people because of who they are. Perhaps most obviously, it denies people the
property stake in their own lives – a right that the Founders believed were imperative to a
well-functioning society. As mentioned earlier, the Founders believed that this property
stake extended not only to material items but to aspects such as religious opinions and
personal safety. Acts of genocide specifically aim to eliminate the diversity of ideas,
backgrounds, and beliefs that James Madison and others believed would create a robust
marketplace of ideas. The Framers were concerned with creating an environment that
promoted people’s individual skills and talent. In contrast, genocide rips away people’s
dignity and violates their sense of self-worth. For genocide to occur, citizens must be
stripped of their sense of self and boiled down to simple defining characteristics,
characteristics that those perpetrating genocide see as undesirable. Victims’ contributions
to society are either not considered or are seen as justification for complete elimination.
Given the above characteristics, acts of genocide clearly violate the Founders’ desire for
all people to have a strong sense of liberty, liberty that allows them to achieve both
individual and communal happiness.
In addition to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, the Framers revered what
justice, social equality, and diversity could provide in a society. As mentioned before,
genocide aims to systematically eliminate diversity in society by eradicating a complete
class of people based on a specific characteristic that identifies that group. The Founders
believed that people should be treated fairly in the distribution of both benefits and
burdens of society. Genocide unfairly penalizes one group in a society, with devastating
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effects. It shifts the burden to this group because of characteristics, like race and
ethnicity, that they oftentimes have no control over. While the Framers created a
government that made explicitly sure to protect and promote divergent and minority
opinions, genocide singles-out and extinguishes those who are considered undesirable by
another group. Those promoting acts of genocide have absolutely no tolerance for
difference. In fact, many believe that one of the concrete ways to prevent genocide is by
creating universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial differences.53 Overall,
what the Founders hoped to establish was a society in which people were free and
protected to live their lives as they saw fit. In exchange for giving up some of their
liberties to the government, the Founders believed that the government could give back to
the citizenry by protecting their individual interests and ideas. In contrast, genocide is,
among other things, a form of social control - a response to behavior defined as deviant.54
Grievances against a group are handled through systemic mass killings. Victims of
genocide are typically harmed because they are categorized as an undesirable “other”
class. What makes them unique in society, the uniqueness that the Founders aimed to
foster, is used against them.
Reclaiming our Values through Humanitarian Intervention in Genocide
So far, this paper has shown that since the founding, the United States has made
marked shifts away from its founding values, especially with respect to the nation’s
foreign policy. The question remains whether humanitarian intervention, in genocide
specifically, can act as an effective way to reclaim those values in a substantial way.
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Given the fact that acts of genocide violate most, if not every, American founding value,
it seems somewhat obvious that American intervention in genocide presents a strong way
for the country to reclaim its founding values. That being said, there are principle issues
that must be addressed.
One important dilemma is that of state sovereignty. The United Nations Charter
specifically says: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state.55 Does this mean that countries like the United States are cautioned against
intervention during threats to peace, such as genocide? The first operational principle of
what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) calls
the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) is as follows: “Where a population is suffering
serious harm… and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt of avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.56 In
other words, R2P is an international law doctrine that permits collective humanitarian
intervention to prevent or mitigate extreme human rights disasters, including genocide.57
At the same time, sovereignty is a core feature of nation-statehood and the responsibilityto-protect doctrine challenges sovereignty fundamentally. Many scholars have written on
and discussed the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.
The general concern is whether recent international laws and covenants, such as the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, are
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incompatible with the traditional understanding of international society and the
sovereignty of states. Some scholars argue that humanitarian intervention can be
humanitarian at best only in part. In other words, each case must be evaluated
individually because there are times when coercive intervention in a sovereign nationstate is not justified by the conditions of oppression in that country.58 The irony lies in the
fact that humanitarian intervention constitutes a breach of state sovereignty, yet the key to
the effective observance of human rights remains national law and practice.
As it turns out, the concepts of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention
might not be as incompatible as they first seem. Generally, it’s believed that state
sovereignty, when applied to international relations, is grounded in the will of
international society and the citizens who make up that society.59 In other words, the
principles outlined in the UN Charter do not rule out the application of enforcement
measures in cases where human rights are clearly being violated. The Genocide
Convention also overrode the non-intervention principle to allow for the commitment of
the world community to prevent and punish.60 Many scholars believe that the respect for
sovereignty that the international community holds is dependent on the capacity and will
of the state to protect humanity. Abject failure to do so can lead to a fundamental
forfeiture of the rights of sovereignty.61 humanitarian intervention, and the greater R2P
principle, reinforces sovereignty by helping states to meet their existing responsibilities.
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When it comes to the rights and fundamental freedoms belonging to individuals, states
have simply assumed responsibility for them,
On the topic of the relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian
intervention, the Founders sought to define a national good that transcended local
interests and prejudices. Though they were deeply divided on how to properly conduct
foreign policy, from a broader view, they looked to develop and spread a strong
framework of foundational principles through the country’s foreign policy. The purpose
was to demonstrate to the larger community of nations the feasibility of self-government
and the application of justice as a sustainable ground for relations among people and
nations.62 The Founders rejected modern approaches to American foreign policy
represented by power politics, isolationism, and crusading internationalism. Instead, they
design a truly American foreign policy - fundamentally shaped by the application of
universal ideas, such as human equality, natural rights, and the rule of law. Overall, it
seems as though there is a consensus from scholars and diplomats alike that humanitarian
intervention is generally justified, as national sovereignty is outweighed by a more
collective need to uphold basic human rights.
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Chapter III: Constitutional Law - Trump’s Constitutionally Enumerated War
Power
Since the United States’ intervention in Kosovo, many international lawyers,
scholars, and politicians have argued in favor of R2P. That being said, it is important to
examine larger legal issues concerning humanitarian intervention, including the
President’s Constitutional war power.
War power and humanitarian intervention are inextricably tied and the use of
military force to respond to a foreign humanitarian crisis raises profound legal questions,
especially when force is not authorized by Congress or the U.N. Security Council. Ever
since the founding of the country, the pace and scope of intervention have only grown in
speed, lethality, and geopolitical importance. These trends have important and farreaching implications on the constitutional debate surrounding the powers of war and
peace. Who exactly has constitutionally granted the power to commit and deploy troops
internationally? This section will look at the history of the war power, with respect to
both the executive and legislative branches. It will conclude with an analysis of the war
power as it currently stands and the significance of this on the President’s ability to
instigate intervention.
The War Power and its Modern Interpretation
The war power was almost immediately contested after the framing of the
Constitution and, if anything, has only become more so as executive and legislative
branches push and pull for respective powers in this arena. Surprisingly, the Founders
remained intentionally vague about Congressional and Presidential war powers. Much of
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the literature on the topic aims to argue that each branch brings unique advantages in
times of crisis and war. These advantages, and the competing constitutional
interpretations that accompany each, have been outlined and argued by many scholars.
Within the debate over Congress and the executive’s powers of war, many commentators
take either a narrow or an expansive view of the powers that Article I, Section 8 and
Article II give to Congress and the executive branch respectively. The way the courts
choose to interpret Article I and II is of the utmost importance, as it determines President
Trump’s ability to send military force in areas affected by genocide.
Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution outlines the President’s powers in this arena. It
begins by stating that executive power is vested in a President of the United States. In
addition, it makes the President the commander in chief and gives him power to make
treaties granted the advice and consent of the Senate.63 This article in particular greatly
divides those who take a narrow reading and those who take a more expansive reading of
both the legislature’s and the executive’s war power. To the latter, Article 2’s “vesting”
clause gives the President sweeping power to make decisions in times of war. More
narrow interpreters do not deny the power of the vesting clause but instead argue that the
remainder of Article 2 is simply a binding list of the specific powers vested in the
executive – an exhaustive list of all of the enumerated powers the President has during
times of conflict.64 Had the Founders wanted the executive to have a larger scope of
power, they would have lengthened the list of acceptable actions like we find in Article I.
Narrow interpreters go on to argue that Article II, in addition to being a short list, does
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not include a “necessary and proper” clause that grants the President overarching powers
to act as she deems fit in times of crisis.
On the other hand, those who interpret the articles in a more expansive way have
argued that the first sentence of Article 2 vests in the President all of the powers that fall
under the general rubric of “executive power”.65 Being the sole representative for the
United States’ foreign affairs, many scholars argue that this role gives him expansive
powers over the United States’ actions in times of war and crisis. The nation must speak
with one voice, not the voices of 50 individual states. To many, that power and duty are
given and enumerated in the Constitution.
Regardless of a specific interpretation of the relevant amendments, it is clear that
both the legislative and executive branches are in key positions, and possess unique
skills, to be able to manage and respond to war or a crisis. This is exactly what the
Founders wanted and intended. The branches are not sealed off from each other in the
decision-making process. Instead, they harbor shared powers. To be effective, many war
and crisis-time decisions need to be made through the cooperation of more than one
branch. At the same time, as Mariah Zeisberg argues in her novel War Powers: The
Politics of Constitutional Authority, “if the branches did not have structural
independence, “their colliding claims could be settled through enforced deference.”66
The Legal Cases Behind Modern Interpretations
It is this tension between reliance and independence that drive important debates
and perspectives from each branch on the nature of war power. It also highlights the
distinct advantages that each branch brings. For example, scholars argue that the
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President, distinctive from Congress, has the unique ability to respond quickly to
changing circumstances. The hierarchical nature of the branch and its unique resources
allow the executive to respond much more efficiently and effectively in times of crisis.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer highlights this argument quite well. In
1950, President Truman authorized the use of American troops in the conflict between
North Korea and South Korea, calling it a “policing action” rather than an entrance into
war.67 In the face of strikes by the United Steelworkers Union and a potential shortage of
the steel necessary for the creation of ammunition, Truman issued an executive order to
seize the steel mills and place them under government control. The day after, Truman
reported the action he had taken and stated that he would follow any action taken by
Congress. In response, the steel companies obtained an injunction. The majority opinion
of the Court fell in favor of the plaintiffs. Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Vinson argued
broadly that the extraordinary times called for extraordinary powers. He argued that the
plaintiffs did not reject the fact that any stoppage of steel production would immediately
place the Nation in peril. Chief Justice Vinson argued that even though there was an
absence of express statutory authorization, it was under President Truman’s constitutional
power to meet a critical situation like this one with immediate action. The alternative
would have left the President completely powerless, and at the mercy of a slow-moving
legislature, in a moment when the survival of the United States in foreign matters could
only be ensured through immediate action. In this case, President Truman was simply
performing his central duty under the Constitution to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
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Chief Justice Vinson’s argument rests on the expansive interpretation of Article 2
stated earlier. That being said, many of his major assertions rest on the broad belief that,
apart from statutory or constitutional permission, there are times when the executive is in
a better position to make informed and timely decisions – especially in times of crisis.
Zeisberg articulates this idea well. She argues that “while presidents can gain access to
the knowledge of agencies by consulting them, decision-making according to rules and
bureaucratic organization is only one model of successful executive branch
functioning.”68 As she goes on the argue, President Truman was able to make excellent
judgments using informal consultations with a selected core, rather than through rigid
adherence to bureaucratic procedure. The fundamental flexibility of the executive branch
is critical, and a matter of practical necessity, when meeting critical situations.69
To many, the War Powers Resolution (WPR) was seen as an admittance by
Congress of the executive’s power to act quickly as well as a re-assertion by the
legislative branch of its ability to check that power.70 In 1973, Congress attempted to
reassert its constitutional authority by passing the Resolution over President Nixon’s
veto. The WPR formally grants the President the ability to put troops into action, yet
limits executive power as well. Broadly speaking, it gives the executive branch the power
to act without clear congressional approval under three distinct circumstances. It also
requires the President to consult with Congress regularly and terminate his use of United
States Armed Forces within 60 days, unless Congress grants him permission to keep them
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deployed.71 Proponents of the WPR see it as a renewed sense of congressional
responsibility and a reiteration of the principles of separation of powers and collective
decision-making. It supports the idea that constitutional authority in times of crisis or war
is dynamic. It is truly constructed within the constitutional framework rather than located
primarily in either the executive or the legislature. In many instances, executive action
can be justified because had the President not acted, the very Constitution, and by nature
the very nation itself, would have been compromised. As Alexander Hamilton so neatly
articulated in Federalist Paper No. 23, too strict an observance of constitutional limits
could potentially result in constitutional failure.72 The necessity of this executive power
needs to be controlled by the legislature. The War Powers Resolution is an example of
the important push and pull between executive and legislative war power. It serves as a
clear effort to give life to one of the defining features of American constitutional order –
the principle that power should be both shared and accountable.
As expected, this interpretation of executive power raises concerns over the
bloating of presidential war power and the eventual inability of Congress to ever act as a
co-equal partner in this space. The evolution of war power in response to the quickening
pace and growing lethality of conflict open the door for overstepping by the executive
during times of crisis and the justifications of actions through precedent. These concerns
are valid and should not be disregarded as insubstantial worries. There have times in the
past when the executive branch uses precedent and a loose interpretation of their war
powers to make regrettable decisions. One such instance of this is Korematsu v. United
States. In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was widespread fear that
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an attack on the West Coast of the United States was imminent. Many politicians argued
for the internment of local Japanese Americans, citing “the threat of sabotage and
espionage.”73 As a result, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that gave the
military the power to “relocate” Japanese Americans to several internment camps located
in the Western United States. Fred Korematsu resisted the order to move and was arrested
and convicted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. In the majority opinion, Justice
Black supported the executive order, arguing that the Court was unable to conclude that it
was beyond the war power of the executive to exclude the Japanese from the West Coast
area. In other words, Black supported President Roosevelt’s actions as extraordinary
measures taken in the face of “apprehension by the proper military authorities of the
gravest imminent danger to the public safety.”74 As Justice Frankfurter added, in a
concurring opinion, “the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in
the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in
times of peace would be lawless.”75 Similar to the dissenting argument made in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, both Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter
grounded their arguments in the assertion that the executive was allowed extraordinary
powers in times of national crisis. At the time, though later determined to be fueled in
part by racist sentiments, fear of attack had pressed local and national politicians,
supported by many constituents, to demand quick action by the executive. This
constituted an active understanding that the President was in a better position to take
immediate action in response to growing concern.
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As history shows, it later became known General John L. DeWitt, the general who
called for the order, knew there was no real legitimate threat. Nonetheless, he had enough
power in the clout of war to get President Roosevelt to issue the executive order. The
order resulted in the internment of over 100,000 residents and was later admitted to being
a decision largely based on race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political
leadership. Korematsu v. United States is a case that resulted from the use of very
harmful executive war power. Basic liberties are in danger when a branch uses the
extraordinary times of war to legitimize otherwise unlawful behavior. There will be,
throughout history, times when this happens, and when the judiciary’s ruling supports on
the unconstitutional side of the case.
Ever since the Founding, the debate over the power of the legislature and
executive in times of war and crisis has been heated and will continue to be so. As is seen
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and Korematsu v. United States, the powers
granted to the executive in particular have only grown in scope and importance,
sometimes with devastating consequences. While this trend has raised fears in many
about the burgeoning powers of the President, and what can go wrong when executive
powers are not checked, these cases also show that he is in a unique power to make quick
and informed decision when those are most necessary to the survival of the country. The
question then becomes whether this unique position outweighs the unbalancing of war
powers between the branches. As Jefferson points out, the executive and legislative
branches will always be beholden to the People, who have enormous power to keep the
two branches in check in this regard.
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Much like other constitutional amendments, the Constitution is broad on the
subject of war powers. It can be inferred that this was an intentional action by the
Founders, who wanted to provide only the outlines of what the war powers should look
like. Though this vagueness has spurred contentious debate on the subject, it has also
allowed the document to be malleable enough to survive over a century. The President’s
domination of foreign policy and war power is a natural response to the quickening pace
of intervention and the advancements of military technology. Increasingly, decisions on
these topics have needed to be made with very little time – something the legislature
cannot do because of its fundamental nature. Therefore, we need to embrace the
vagueness of these powers, and take a fluid approach to understanding Congress’ war
power, the executive war power, and how to two interact. This needs to occur on the
foundation of the power’s enumerated by the Constitution and accepted by the People.
Each branch has a unique and valuable perspective and set of skill it brings. This
approach to war powers takes advantage of this and moves away from a more rigid
constitutional interpretation.
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Chapter IV: Trump’s Military Credibility
So far, it’s been established that the United States has an abysmal history with
respect to humanitarian intervention. Working to combat genocide through intervention
represents an opportunity for the United States to re-embrace its founding values, inject
pride and confidence into our political institutions, and set an example that other
powerful nations look to follow. That being said, the analysis is not so simple. Foreign
policy decisions, especially by powerful countries like the United States, are not made in
a bubble. There are important geopolitical factors that must be taken into consideration. It
can be argued that these factors are of even greater importance in humanitarian
intervention than wars, since the possible gains achieved by the intervening country are
lower and the risks often higher. Humanitarian intervention presents the opportunity for
the United States to reclaim its founding values, but at what cost? This chapter will look
at the effect that humanitarian intervention in genocide has on the United States’ military
credibility. For the sake of this paper, credibility will be defined as the belief held by
others that a country will carry out its threats and promises.
The Military Credibility Trap
According to the 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength written by the Heritage
Foundation, the United States risks seeing its interests increasingly challenged and the
world order it has led since World War II undone.76 The Index argues that the United
States does not presently have the right force to meet a two-major regional contingency
requirement (MRC) and that it is not ready to carry out its duties effectively. MRC refers
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to the ability of the United States to confront and defeat aggression from two adversaries
at a time. Though these calculated weaknesses may be accurate, military capability is not
directly related to military credibility. In fact, a country’s military strength in the eyes of
allies and adversaries can be much different from the realities of that strength on the
ground.
Many politicians believe that if the United States backs down from a crisis that it
has entered, the country’s future credibility will be greatly reduced in the eyes of allies
and adversaries alike.77 This fear of diminished credibility largely motivated the United
States’ costly involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars. It has continued to guide
American policy decisions since the Cold War, as the threat of Communism made it
imperative for states to not doubt U.S. power or resolve.78 Granted, the United States is
perceived to be the linchpin of a vast alliance network. Because of this, it must convince
many other countries that its promises and capabilities are believable.79 Since then, the
fear of losing credibility has helped propel the United States into conflicts in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya. Regardless of astounding evidence against the theory of
credibility, both the U.S. military and foreign policy elite are quick to embrace the notion
that U.S. credibility is both fragile and all-important because it provides another reason
for large defense budgets and involvement in conflicts around the world.
Though the above analysis relates largely to U.S. involvement in war, this
mindset has pervaded Washington’s understanding of humanitarian intervention as well.
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A series of factors have been identified by scholars as contributing to the reluctance of
politicians to advocate for intervention. For one, past failed interventions tend to make
much larger impressions on stakeholders than successful ones. Studies have shown that
the more successful a humanitarian intervention is, the less likely it is to leave traces on
people’s political and moral consciousness.80 Disastrous situations tend to leave larger
and longer lasting impressions on our collective conscience than successful ones. In
addition, this relationship is often due to a lack of counterfactual scenarios - it is
impossible to accurately calculate what would have happened had the United States and
its allies not intervened in a situation. One scholar sees this phenomenon as the moral
distinction between “doing harm” and “allowing harm”.81 While a failed intervention is
seen as a case of actively doing harm by making the situation worse, failing to intervene
is only a case of not preventing harm. Since we are justified in assigning greater moral
weight to harm than failing to prevent it, we are justified in giving more weight to failed
interventions than to failed non-interventions.82
In addition, there seems to be a pervasive and fundamental belief held by
politicians and power-players that countries who choose to prioritize humanitarian
intervention in their foreign policy agendas are “weak” or “soft”. American leaders worry
that other states will question the United States’ resolve and capability if it ever loses
even a minor scrap in the developing world. As has been argued earlier, humanitarian
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intervention is rarely seen as geopolitically advantageous for the United States to
participate in. Given these two factors, politicians rarely advocate for it.
Given how widespread this belief is, it is highly concerning that studies using
historical evidence and declassified documents have shown the theory of “credibility” in
foreign policy to be largely unsubstantiated. Political scientists have investigated the
theory repeatedly and have disproven it time and time again. There is no evidence that
America’s allies or enemies change their behavior based on conclusions about America’s
credibility, or that such a form of reputation even exists in foreign policy. As one scholar
argues, “when leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, they do not
assess their adversaries’ credibility by peering into their opponents’ past and evaluating
their history of keeping or breaking commitments.”83 Research by Ted Hopf, Jonathan
Mercer, and Daryl Press has proven that states do not judge the credibility of
commitments in one place by looking at how a country has acted somewhere far away.84
Historically, when the United States has “lost”, the country’s core strategic relations have
remained unaffected.85 For example, during the Vietnam War, American officials could
clearly see that they were losing but for years worried that withdrawing would
communicate weakness to the Soviet Union. In turn, politicians were scared that this
would embolden Moscow to test American commitments elsewhere. As it turns out, this
line of thinking was seriously flawed. Soviet leaders never reached such a conclusion
and, in fact, were puzzled as to why the U.S. had chosen to sacrifice so many lives for a
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war that was clearly lost.86 How has the credibility myth become so entrenched in
Washington? Many scholars point to the fact that the theory is attractive because it paints
complicated geo-politics in simple and familiar human terms. It encourages politicians
and scholars to think of states as just like people.87 In addition, America’s broad network
of alliances plays a key role. It allows allies who also believe the credibility myth to
entangle themselves in U.S. foreign policy decisions.88 In a nutshell, quantitative tests of
the intangible concept of credibility, in an environment plagued by problems of strategic
selection, have not consistently demonstrated that opponents take reputations of resolve
seriously.89
What influence has this thinking had on the United States’ foreign policy
decisions? For one, Washington’s obsession with the threat of weakening credibility has
forced U.S. foreign policy to become unnecessarily rigid. In every case, a belief in
“credibility” pulls the United States towards either fighting a war for the wrong reasons
or staying in a conflict longer than is worthwhile.90 This presents a clear dilemma
because scholarship shows that one of the most important ways the U.S. can retain its
global influence is by convincing states that the country is capable of sound judgment,
not through the thoroughly-debunked theory of military credibility. According to Stephen
M. Walt, a professor of international relations and Harvard University, U.S. commitments
are most credible when the American interest in an area is obvious to all, mostly because
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states attempt to figure out how the United States is going to act in an area by attempting
to discern whether it is in the country’s best interest to do so.91 If U.S. allies believe that
the United States is skillful at weighing situations soberly and rationally, then they can
collaborate their actions and will be more inclined to follow the U.S.’ lead.
Intervention in Genocide as a Source of Military Credibility
As argued earlier, Washington’s obsession with the credibility myth has led the
United States to either involve itself in frivolous conflicts abroad or stay in failed wars
long past the appropriate time. Not only has this led to the exhaustion of military
resources and loss of life, but it has also had devastating consequences for the U.S.’
perceived brand of foreign policy. Donald Trump’s presidency, including his perceived
lack of competence both generally and with regards to foreign policy, has only intensified
the U.S.’ suffering global reputation. In foreign policy, competence depends on a
sufficient knowledge regarding the state of the world and the key forces that drive world
politics. This knowledge is what drives well-informed and intelligent policy decisions.92
It also means having organizational skills, discipline, and a level of judgment that allows
for these different elements to combine in the pursuit of well-chosen goals. It is widely
believed that President Trump lacks these skills. Scholars arguing this point to his blatant
nepotism, vast conflicts of interest, overt misogyny, and repeated fabrication of facts.93
This incompetence has already made itself apparent.94 For example, President Trump’s
decision to drop the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was seen by many scholars and
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politicians as an enormous policy mistake. Not only has it undermined the United States’
position in Asia, but it has also opened the door for larger Chinese influence, effectively
hurting the U.S.’ economy. In fact, Trump recently asked trade officials to explore the
possibility of the United States rejoining the TPP agreement. A similar narrative can be
made for his decision to pull out of the Paris climate accord.95 Apart from the political,
economic, and social consequences of these actions, a weakening of the United States’
global reputation has also led U.S. allies to question the country’s advice, guidance, and
requests.96 It can be argued that states that lose confidence in America’s confidence will
begin to hedge and make their own arrangements. They’ll do deals with each other and
might even begin to regard the United States as an adversary.
Scholarship shows that one of the most important ways the U.S. can retain and
strengthen its global influence is by convincing states that the country is capable of sound
judgment. The “credibility” myth, coupled with President Trump’s brand of foreign
policy, has weakened the country’s reputation to devastating ends. Looking forward, it is
imperative that the U.S. government look at ways it can increase its reputation in the eyes
of its allies and adversaries. This section will argue that humanitarian intervention in
genocide, under certain circumstances, presents a clear way for the United States to
increase its reputation for good judgment in the eyes of the international community. In
order to minimize the perceived invasion of another state’s credibility, a possible problem
acknowledged and addressed earlier, the United States should only intervene in genocide
under certain circumstances, as outlined in the scholarly article The State and Human
95
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Rights: Sovereignty versus Humanitarian Intervention by Simon Duke. Humanitarian
intervention should only be sanctioned under the following conditions:97
1. there is a provable and grave violation of fundamental human rights
2. such violations are extensive and pose the threat of widespread loss of life
3. all other recourse beneath the level of intervention has been exhausted
4. any use of force should be proportional, whereby it protects those
endangered but aims to cause minimum disruption or disturbance to other
factors aside from human rights
5. intervention should, where possible, involve some form of consent from
the host state
Creating and using a strong the framework above will help prevent the United States
from entangling itself in a humanitarian situation that either does not warrant
international invasion or ends up further crumbling the country’s reputation for decision
making and sound reasoning. Equally as important, it will help quell worries by
politicians and scholars that humanitarian intervention in genocide is an unnecessary risk
leading to little or no reward for the United States. This is because the framework above
helps to ensure that the U.S. enters humanitarian conflicts only when the need is clear, the
mission is feasible, and U.S. leaders are confident that intervention will not make matters
worse.98 In doing so, the United States can begin to rebuild its reputation as a rational
actor. This rebuilding will hopefully lead to a strengthening of ally relationships and a
stronger foreign policy overall. Sticking to this framework, and intervening in genocide
when all of the conditions are met, will help ensure that humanitarian intervention
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becomes an opportunity for the United States to increase its reputation in the eyes of its
allies.
Genocide will always constitute a provable and grave violation of fundamental
human rights. This is an important characteristic, because being able to show doubtless
violations of this nature means that a legal basis for corrective measures can be
established. Even when access is denied by a state, advancements in surveillance
technology have made it increasingly difficult for perpetrators of genocide to stem the
flow of information regarding violations of human rights.99 Genocide also meets the
second requirement - that the human rights abuses be extensive and pose the threat of
widespread loss of life. “Extensive” refers to the ability of an official observer to
establish a pattern of abuse and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that lives are in
danger.100
One of the most important dimensions of the framework is that humanitarian
intervention employing the use of force should not be undertaken until all other forms of
persuasion aimed at saving lives have been attempted. These may include direct appeals
by the U.S. government, ad hoc bodies, regional organizations, specialized nongovernmental organizations, private institutions, and the United Nations itself.101 It is
important to note that oftentimes, actions short of armed humanitarian intervention may
exacerbate human rights abuses. For example, the use of economic blockades often harms
those already subject to humanitarian abuse. The United States should make efforts to
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coordinate its efforts in this phase with these other institutions. Not only will this make
those effort more effective, but it will also present the U.S. with the chance to strengthen
its relationship with these powerful allies and strengthen its reputation by proving its
foreign policy prowess. If the United States can get the backing, support, and resources of
international institutions and countries, this will significantly strengthen its offensive
strategy.
Part four of the framework ensures that the United States does not monopolize the
political or social weakening of the country it invades. It narrows the scope of U.S.
influence and acknowledges that it is not the job of the interventionist to do anything
more than enforce the stipulations of international treaties pertaining to human rights.
The United States should avoid efforts to largely influence or change the political,
religious, or cultural values of the country in question. Humanitarian intervention in
genocide is a response to the immediate needs of victims of violence and not an answer to
the longer-term stability of a regime or country.102 Along this same vein, the United
States should look to limit the time it is directly intervening in a conflict. Finally, the
United States should try and establish some degree of consent from the host state. Similar
to the other stipulations explained above, this will help guarantee that the state maintains
as much sovereignty as possible. Otherwise, the United States risks charges of
unwarranted meddling in the internal affairs of another state by both people in the U.S.
government and abroad.
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Humanitarian intervention in genocide has many practical difficulties and has
proven to be a destructive tool for international peace and stability if used incorrectly.
That being said, it can also be an extremely powerful tool. Following the framework
outlined above will help prevent the United States from entangling itself in a
humanitarian situation that further tarnishes the United States foreign policy brand in the
eyes of Americans and international actors. It also serves as an opportunity for the U.S. to
strengthen relationships with allies and international institutions. Following a strong
framework, developing actionable steps, and making sound policy decisions will help the
country create a very sound brand of foreign policy and strengthen the United States’
domestic and international reputation.
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Chapter V: A Case Study – The Darfur Genocide
This chapter will attempt to cement the theories and framework discussed above
to a real-world case study. The current genocide occurring in Darfur, Sudan will be
critically analyzed. To begin, a synthesized background of the conflict will be presented.
Though the application of the framework established in Chapter IV, this paper will
attempt to determine whether it is geopolitically strategic and advantageous for the
United States to intervene in the conflict.
Background
Darfur is a region in Western Sudan, It is considered the largest country in Africa
and encompasses an area roughly the size of Texas.103 Darfur had a pre-conflict
population of about six million people. Civil war has existed between the northern and
southern regions of Sudan for over ten years.104 Following independence from Britain in
1965, Sudan became involved in two prolonged civil wars for most of the 20th century.
These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of
largely non-Muslim and non-Arab southern Sudanese;105 While the northern region is
predominantly made up of Muslims who are ethnically Arab, the South is largely
inhabited by groups of Christians. Competition for scarce resource has plated a serious
role in furthering the conflict. Adding to the complexities of the violence are

103

“Ten Terrible Facts”, 2018.
“Genocide in the Darfur Region”, 2011.
105
“Darfur Genocide”, 2017.
104

Arntson 48

desertification, famines, and the discovery of oil that has made the Sudanese government
and international contributors increasingly interested in the land.106
Though the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the civil war in 2005, the
country remained largely underdeveloped and marginalized at the federal level, lacking
both infrastructure and substantive development assistant. These factors have made the
environment ripe with opportunity for conflict between Muslims in the north and
Christians in the south. Killings largely began in the Spring of 2003, after two Darfuri
rebel groups launched a rebellion against the Sudanese government by attacking an air
force base in Al-Fashir.107 They demanded an end to the oppression of Darfur’s non-Arab
population and economic marginalization. In response, the Sudanese government enlisted
a group of government-armed and funded Arab militias known as the Janjaweed (“devils
on horseback”) to resolve the conflict.108 These militias have killed at least 70,000
villagers – with estimated deaths ranging above 300,000 – have raped thousands more,
and have driven roughly two and a half million into refugee camps, many in the
neighboring country of Chad.109
Despite a ceasefire agreement signed by a number of groups involved in the
conflict, including the Sudanese government and various rebel groups, violence
continued in Darfur. In the Summer of 2004, dozens of political groups and bodies,
including the U.S. Congress and the EU Parliament, recognized western Sudan as a site
of genocide. Colin Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, became the first member of the
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U.S. executive branch to declare the conflict in Darfur “a genocide.” He openly told the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that a genocide had been carried out in Darfur,
that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were responsible, and that the genocide
may still be ongoing.110 Then-President George W. Bush called for the number of
international troops in Darfur to be doubled. In addition, then Presidential candidate
Barak Obama campaigned on the issue in 2008, referring to the Darfur genocide as a
“stain of our souls”.111 This declaration by the U.S. government was almost unavoidable,
given the annihilating character of attacks on non-Arab civilians and villages in Darfur.
In a directive written in August of 2004, Musa Hilal, one of the most infamous Janjaweed
leaders, plainly spelled out the ambitions of the group. Among other things, he pointed to
the desire to change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes.112 Though
cease-fires were signed by the Sudanese government, it had no intention of honoring the
documents and simply signed them as a way to gain an effective diplomatic cover under
which the work of ethnic cleansing could continue.113 This, coupled with the United
States vague declarations of action, meant that the genocide was largely allowed to
continue unabated.
The expression “never again” is always used whenever U.S. politicians talk about
human rights atrocities such as genocide. Any discussion of the Holocaust, Yugoslavia,
Cambodia, or Rwanda elicits a plea that such violence and hatred should never happen
again. Despite an abundance of information about the atrocities occurring in Sudan, what
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ensued was a systematic denial of humanitarian aid to the ethnic populations most
affected. There have been some steps in the right direction. For example Omar al-Bashir,
the President of Sudan, was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2010
for the crime of genocide. This constituted the first instance of the ICC issuing a warrant
for genocide to a sitting head of state.114 That being said, the international community at
large took the same stance with regards to Darfur as it did with the Rwandan genocide –
that of an outside observer and bystander. According to author and scholar Rebecca Joyce
Frey, Bashir and other leaders realized that the lack of intervention in Rwanda from the
international community largely gave them free rein to continue the genocide without
having any serious concerns over international intervention.115
Past and Future U.S. Involvement
A brief look into the history of the genocide in Darfur shows a systematic choice
by countries to avoid any sort of substantive military intervention in the area. Though
there have been attempts by the African Union and United Nations to station troops in the
area, their ranks have never grown beyond 9,000 and they have made little progress in
stopping the destruction, let alone in reversing it by allowing millions of displaced
Darfuris to begin returning to their homeland.116 Though Powell warned that the United
States might take the issue to the UN Security Council if the Sundanese government
continued to wreak havoc, those threats amounted to a simple threat that sanctions might
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be imposed.117 Despite a significant decrease in armed conflict in South Sudan, civilians
in Darfur are still being constantly exposed to violence and criminality.118 According to
Human Rights Watch, Sudan’s human rights record remains abysmal, with continued
attacks on civilians by government forces and widespread arbitrary detentions of activists
and protesters.119 A long-term comprehensive solution to address the needs of the
region’s people remains elusive. Despite efforts on the park of by UNAMID and the
African Union High-Level Implementation Pavel, little tangible progress has been made
in the Darfur peace process.120 A recent Security Council briefing revealed that the
situation in Darfur has not yet been normalized; Security issues, unlawful killings, and
human rights violations make the conditions volatile.121 There have been continued
reports of sexual violence and concerns that the government’s ongoing disarmament
campaign is leading to increased tension in armed confrontations that threaten to
undermine recent improvements in the security of the region.122
Using the framework established and explained earlier in this paper, it is now
important to establish whether the United States should gather the military power and
resources necessary for a more substantive and genuine military intervention in Darfur at
this time. What makes the lack of direct U.S. involvement incredibly perplexing is that
U.S. officials have actually used the word “genocide” when describing the atrocities
occurring in Sudan. Unlike other genocides in the past, the one of Darfur has attracted an
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avalanche of material – memoirs, journalistic accounts, and histories just to name a few.
No genocide has ever been so thoroughly documented while it was taking place.123 As
Richard Just writes, “we document what we do not stop. The truth does not set anybody
free.”124 On the bright side, this documentation helps fulfil the first two parts of the
framework. It provides evidence towards a provable and grave violation of fundamental
human rights and the guarantee that the violations are both extensive and pose a threat of
widespread loss of life. The UN estimates that between 200,000 and 300,000 people have
died in Darfur since the start of the current conflict in 2004. Out of the 7.4 million total
people living in the region, an estimated 6.4 million people are currently directly affected
by the conflict.125 These deaths have been well-documented. Many people were placed in
the area as unarmed “observers”. In his novel The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing
Witness to the Genocide in Darfur, Brian Steidle talks about his time documenting the
tragedy.126 His job was to monitor violations of a given cease-fire. After a village had
been attacked, Steidle and his team would investigate, interviewing victims and
photographing the destruction. With the information they gathered, they would write
reports, which were sent to the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia.127 This
abundance of documentation shows that violations of human rights by the governmentfunded militias are abundant and widespread. Over the course of just one massacre in the
village of Hamada, 107 villagers were brutally tortured and murdered.128 Bodies were
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strewn along blood-soaked village paths. There are reports that infants had been crushed
– their faces smashed with rifle butts and their bodies tossed into the dirt. These accounts
confirm in full that the first two parts of the framework are wholeheartedly fulfilled.
To fulfil the third part of the framework, it is important to assess whether all other
recourse beneath the level of intervention has been exhausted. In terms of U.S.
involvement, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama took stands on the conflict
in various ways, yet meaningful action towards improving the situation was never taken.
As mentioned earlier, the Bush administration went as far as to declare what was
happening in the region a “genocide”. This was a large step in the right direction,
considering how in earlier conflicts the term had been avoided by politicians in an
attempt to minimize public insistence on intervention. In addition, President Bush’s
administration was instrumental in bringing about the December 31st “permanent ceasefire”. It also pressed, in vain, for international sanctions to force Sudan to stop the killing
in Darfur.129 As mentioned earlier, though cease-fire agreements were signed by
members of the Sudanese government, they were largely ineffective at curbing the
violence. Though the ICC was eventually able to denounce Sudanese leaders for crimes
against humanity due to their role in the genocide, the United States was a large inhibitor
of this progress. The administration worked to block a proposal to authorize the ICC to
investigate war crimes, pushing instead for an ad hoc regional court.130 This was
dismissed by many as doomed to delay and ineffectiveness. Many saw the ICC as the
best hope for pressing the fear of prosecution into Sudanese leaders.
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President Obama inherited the responsibility for integrating Darfur into U.S.
policy. During his campaign, he had expressed the importance of ending the genocide.131
In 2006, he made a promise to the people of Darfur: “We can’t say ‘never again’ and
allow it to happen again. As President of the United States, I don’t intend to abandon
people or turn a blind eye to slaughter.”132 Unilateral economic sanctions continued under
his administration, among other non-interventionist policies.133 In a sad turn of events,
the outgoing president issued an executive order lifting most of its sanctions against the
government of Sudan.134 Why the change in policy? The executive order stated that
lifting the sanctions was in response to Sudan’s new cooperation on counter-terrorism,
helpful moves towards ending the civil war in South Sudan, and supposed progress
towards reaching a political settlement with various armed and unarmed domestic
opponents.135 That being said, it largely disregarded the continued human rights abuses
that were occurring by the Sudanese government into its own people. As Ahmed Koduda,
a commentator on East African affairs, argued at the time, “Domestically, nothing has
really changed… The Americans really want to get this done one way or another and
wanted to make it palatable to the advocacy community… the regime has not done
anything domestically to warrant this change.”136 These moves came as an attempt to
normalize relations with the country. While this strategy isn’t new, prior attempts at
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normalization had always been accompanied by clear conditions regarding the ending of
human rights violations. This was not the case here.
This brief history shows that up until this point, entirely non-militaristic avenues
have been pursued in attempts to curb the human rights abuses occurring in Darfur. These
have included various cease-fire agreements and economic sanctions among other things.
While troops have been deployed to the region, they have been on the behalf of the
African Union and United Nations; Though conflict and abuses continue in Darfur,
including government attacks on entire villages, the United States has not deployed an
impactful number of troops.137 This history seems to show that not only have all other
forms of recourse been attempted without success, the United States had the manpower
and influence to make a significant difference in the area through armed intervention.
The fourth part of the framework aims to ensure that the United States does not
use the political or social weakening of the country it invades to its own advantage. If the
U.S. is to intervene in Darfur, the intervention should occur according to a specific
timeline. The issue that resides with fulfilling this part of the framework, and ensuring
that military intervention is justified, is the fact that it requires that the military
intervention in question only respond to the immediate needs of the victims. Military
intervention in genocide should not address the long-term stability of the country.
Because the conflict has been occurring since 2004, there have already been attempts at
addressing the Sudanese people’s immediate needs through humanitarian aid. Any
military attempts by the U.S. government would most likely be aimed at reforming the
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current government, as they’re the major perpetrators in the conflict. This would
inevitably lead to a power vacuum that the United States would look to fill through
democratic and free elections. Though military intervention by the U.S. would likely help
stem human rights abuses, it would surely influence the political, social, and economic
values in Sudan. The United States would be exposing itself to backlash from the
international community and would likely be seen as an unwarranted meddler. The
timeline of the conflict also very likely inhibits the U.S. from receiving any sort of
consent from the Sudanese government. In other words, stipulations 4 and 5 are unlikely
to be fulfilled if the United States intervenes in Darfur. As mentioned above,
humanitarian intervention in genocide has many practical difficulties and can be an
incredible destructive tool for both the intervener and the state being intervened in. These
facts show that though something must be done about the human rights abuses occurring
in the area, military intervention by the United States might not be the most domestically
advantageous action to take at this time. In other words, there might be more diplomatic
options that can be pursued to similar effects, without exposing the United States to
increased attacks on its abilities to conduct sound foreign policy. Though this sobering
fact does not completely eliminate U.S. military intervention in the area, it signals that
the United States should look towards other avenues. Perhaps by pursuing meaningful
diplomatic options, the U.S. can still succeed in strengthening relationships with its allies
and stemming human rights abuses. In addition, non-militaristic options can still portray
to the international community that the U.S. is capable of making sound foreign policy
decisions, thereby increasing its international reputation.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
This paper has provided a detailed analysis of the interplay between U.S.
intervention in genocide, the country’s founding values, and our understanding of
reputational credibility in the military sphere. Though an analysis of international
relations theories, constitutional law precedents, and relevant case studies, this paper
argues the following thesis: Humanitarian intervention in genocide, under certain
conditions and with certain stipulations, serves as a feasible way for the United States to
both reclaim its founding values and increase its international reputation. Politicians and
scholars should start seeing humanitarian intervention as a politically strategic avenue for
the United States to pursue.
In addition to a discussion on general theory, a framework was created. The
application if this framework to specific genocides helps the reader to critically evaluate
whether U.S. involvement is justified. As seen in its application to the genocide occurring
in Darfur, this framework helps ensure that the United States does not intervene militarily
in a conflict that ends up further crumbling its international reputational credibility.
Though this paper mainly addresses the theoretical relationship between U.S.
humanitarian intervention, the values of the Framers, and the idea of reputational
credibility as a part of foreign policy, there is much room for expansion into others
topics. These include the morality of military intervention in humanitarian crises and the
effects of powerful intermediaries on international crisis such as genocide. Though the
scope of this paper does not allow the time to dive into these other aspects, they provide
exciting areas for future research on the topic.
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